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INTRODUCTION 
Legal academics have long asked how judicial civil case settlement 
conferences “can be conducted to maximize their usefulness without 
seriously threatening the appropriate role of judges in formal 
adjudication.”1  Some have found the threats so significant and the 
benefits so speculative that they conclude there should be very few, if 
any, judicial settlement conferences.2  Though the numbers of such 
conferences likely will, and should, continue to grow, certain warnings 
by the critics must be heeded.  Even the most ardent supporters of 
increased managerial judging have expressed concerns about the 
absence of written guidelines to govern judicial settlement conferences.3 
While judicial settlement conferencing is here to stay, far too often it is 
undertaken with unbounded, unbridled, and virtually unfettered trial 
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 1 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Essay, For and Against Settlement:  Uses and Abuses of the 
Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485, 486 (1985). 
 2 See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) 
(characterizing settlement as “a highly problematic technique for streamlining dockets”); 
Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27, 90 (2003) 
(“[W]e should abolish, or at least substantially revise, . . . the judicially imposed settlement 
conference.”). 
 3 See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness & Matthew R. Walker, Enforcing Settlements in Federal Civil 
Actions, 36 IND. L. REV. 33, 54-56 (2003) (calling for new written federal laws on ancillary 
settlement enforcement jurisdiction). 
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court discretion.  New written guidelines are needed.  Unfortunately, 
federal judicial rulemakers, who have prompted most of the significant 
civil procedure reforms within American trial courts, beginning with 
their promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938,4 have 
shown little leadership in the area of judicial settlement conferences.  
Further, notwithstanding the Federal Arbitration Act (and its broad use 
of Commerce Clause powers),5 Congress is likely to provide little or no 
leadership.  Fortunately, however, federal and state civil procedure 
lawmakers interested in new written settlement conference guidelines 
can look to some local federal district rules, as well as to a smattering of 
state statutes and court rules, for assistance.  In doing so, they should 
heed critics who warn about the threats judicial settlement conferences 
pose to the traditional judicial role as well as about the need for 
participant control and written standards. 
I. CRITIQUES OF JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES 
Professor Jonathan T. Molot recently observed that civil litigation in 
American trial courts “is changing so rapidly that even new models of 
judging designed to update traditional ones have quickly become 
outdated.”6  Even newer models are necessary today, he says, due to 
“overcrowded dockets” that prompt trial judges to stray from passivity 
and take “an active, largely discretionary approach to pretrial case 
management.”7  Professor Molot joins other distinguished academics 
who have bemoaned the increasing responsibilities of American trial 
court judges in facilitating civil case settlements.8  In contemplating even 
 
 4 FED. R. CIV. P. 86 (prescribing effective date of rules). 
 5 The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2005), has been read to allow Congress 
to impose pro-arbitration policies on the state courts, requiring compulsory and binding 
arbitration agreements, even when state laws frown on arbitrations.  See, e.g., Allied-Bruce 
Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995).  In reaffirming the Act’s applicability to 
state court proceedings, the Allied-Bruce Terminix Court validates the use of Commerce 
Clause power by Congress where contracts in fact involve interstate commerce, even 
though the contracting parties did not contemplate interstate activity.  Id. at 281. 
 6 Molot, supra note 2, at 29. 
 7 Id. 
 8 See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 2, passim.  Professor Judith Resnik, in tribute to Professor 
Fiss, described the landscape: 
 A conflict has emerged between judging as we understand it and systems of 
dispute resolution that lack most of adjudication’s values and attributes.  As 
Owen Fiss has many times insisted, adjudication is predicated on public and 
disciplined fact-finding, licensing judges to impose regulatory obligations.  The 
focus on the individual judge and the belief in adjudication embraces the state as 
a central regulator of conduct.  The presumption is that transparent decision-
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newer models, however, he urges that we reexamine the old, since the 
differing litigation landscapes of today and tomorrow do not render the 
“traditional” model of yesterday irrelevant.9 
Professor Molot’s old model of choice is Professor Lon Fuller’s 
“traditional judicial role.”10  This model has “two guiding principles:  
Judges rel[y] on parties to frame issues and on legal standards to help 
resolve them.”11  Molot finds that this model reflects the “judiciary’s . . . 
core institutional competence, its role in the constitutional structure, and 
the considered judgment of two centuries of judges.”12  Using Fuller’s 
 
making by state-empowered judges can be controlled through judges obliged to 
invoke facts adduced through a record, to give explanations, and to make 
available appellate review. 
 But that view now has a serious competitor, committed to the utility of contract 
and looking to the participants to validate outcomes through consensual 
agreements produced through processes sometimes styled “alternative dispute 
resolution” (ADR) and sometimes “dispute resolution” (DR).  Civil processes are 
one site of the struggle between public and private governance and between 
state-based redistribution efforts and market-focused mechanisms — between 
constitutionalism on the hand [sic], working through a regulatory state that relies 
in part on adjudication, and contract on the other, aimed at maximizing utility by 
reflecting preferences and tastes. 
Judith Resnik, For Owen M. Fiss:  Some Reflections on the Triumph and the Death of 
Adjudication, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 173, 175-76 (2003); cf. Judge Harold Baer, Jr., History, 
Process and a Role for Judges in Mediating Their Own Cases, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 131, 
151 (2001) (stating that well-trained trial judges “should be commended for conducting 
mediations”).  A more recent work by Resnik is Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593 (2005) [hereinafter Resnik, Procedure as Contract] (offering 
guidelines for judicially managed settlement conferences).  An excellent review of the 
varying views on the effects of the emerging (alternative) dispute resolution mechanisms 
on the traditional formal adjudicatory systems and their trial judges appears in Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 1, at 486-90. 
 9 Molot, supra note 2, at 30. 
 10 Id. at 29 (citing Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 
353, 363-87 (1978)).  Professor Resnik nicely described the “traditional” role when she said: 
The old judiciary was doing something different from the modern managerial 
ideal, something quite out of step with the world of time and motion studies.  
Among all of our official decisionmakers, judges — and judges alone — are 
required to provide reasoned explanations for their decisions.  Judges alone are 
supposed to rule without concern for the interests of particular constituencies.  
Judges alone are required to act with deliberation — a steady, slow, unhurried 
task. 
Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376, 445 (1982). 
 11 Molot, supra note 2, at 29. 
 12 Id. at 118.  Resnik has noted that: 
[Fuller’s analysis] rests on a series of normative and political judgments:  that the 
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principles to assess current practices, Molot laments that with the 
“informal” case management tool of the settlement conference,13 a trial 
judge today usually has “a level of control and a degree of discretion that 
strain the boundaries” of the traditional role,14 since the customary 
“litigant input or legal criteria” are lacking.15  For Molot, the old model 
suggests that “we should abolish, or at least substantially revise the 
worst offender in the arsenal of judicial management tools — the 
judicially imposed settlement conference.”16  According to Molot, 
conferences that judges order and direct, at times without consent,17 are 
subject to “virtually unfettered discretion”18 that invites “judicial 
overreaching.”19  Such conferencing may also be unnecessary, in his 
 
state is the appropriate central regulator of conduct, that norm enforcement 
through transparent decisionmaking by state-empowered judges is desirable, 
that public resources ought to be spent upon individual complaints of alleged 
failures to comply with legal obligations, that litigants ought to be provided with 
opportunities to present proofs and reasoned arguments, that the power of 
adjudicators can be controlled by obliging them to rely on facts adduced on the 
record and to perform some of their duties in public, and that legitimate 
judgments thus result. 
Resnik, Procedure as Contract, supra note 8, at 624. 
 13 Molot, supra note 2, at 30. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. at 31. 
 16 Id. at 90.  Molot seems to be addressing settlement conferences ordered and directed 
by individual trial judges in the absence of litigant consent (as contrasted, for example, 
with court-mandated mediation or nonbinding arbitration before lawyers as mediators or 
arbitrators). 
 17 In the absence of consent, a trial court’s power to compel the attendance of parties or 
nonparties (such as lienholders) at settlement conferences may be lacking where there is no 
explicit rule or statutory authorization, such that the court must rely on its inherent judicial 
authority.  For differing views on such power, see the majority and dissenting opinions in 
G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648 passim (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc) 
(reviewing earlier version of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 which did not recognize 
compelling attendance of represented parties).  Compare In re Atl. Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d 135, 
145-47 (1st Cir. 2002) (recognizing inherent power to compel nonbinding nonconsensual 
mediation before private mediator, with costs and expenses to be shared), with In re NLO, 
Inc., 5 F.3d 154, 157-58 (6th Cir. 1993) (“Requiring participation in a summary jury trial, 
where such compulsion is not permitted by the Federal Rules, is an unwarranted extension 
of the judicial power.  Reliance on the pure inherent authority of the court is equally 
misplaced.”). 
 18 Molot, supra note 2, at 92. 
 19 Id. at 87 (noting fewer risks of judicial overreaching when judicial intervention “is 
party-initiated and governed by established legal standards” than when there is “ad hoc 
intervention left to each individual judge’s discretion”).  Molot notes that while litigants 
can always refuse to settle and demand a trial, their settlement conference actions can 
frustrate judges who may then become “hostile.”  Id. at 93.  In addition, settlement talks 
preceded by little or no litigant input are more likely to be driven by “erroneous” judicial 
views prompted by “personal whim.”  Id. at 93 & n.292. 
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view, since most civil cases may settle anyway20 and since there is no 
evidence that wholly private settlement talks result in inequitable 
settlements due to “bargaining imbalances . . . of a kind that judges are 
institutionally equipped to offset.”21 
On the increasing responsibilities of American trial judges in 
facilitating civil case settlements, Professor Owen M. Fiss had earlier 
opined: 
I do not believe that settlement as a generic practice is preferable to 
judgment or should be institutionalized on a wholesale and 
indiscriminate basis.  It should be treated instead as a highly 
problematic technique for streamlining dockets.  Settlement is for 
me the civil analogue of plea bargaining:  Consent is often coerced; 
the bargain may be struck by someone without authority; the 
absence of a trial and judgment renders subsequent judicial 
involvement troublesome; and although dockets are trimmed, 
justice may not be done.  Like plea bargaining, settlement is a 
capitulation to the conditions of mass society and should be neither 
encouraged nor praised.22 
Professor Fiss was particularly troubled by the increasing use of judicial 
settlement conferences as a means of dispute resolution.23  In settlement 
conferences, he noted, trial judges cannot “lessen the impact of 
distributional inequalities” between the parties (involving information 
access, financial pressures to obtain settlement funds earlier, and 
“resources to finance the litigation”) as they can, at least to some degree, 
in trials.24  Settlements, he said, also often leave “justice undone” — in 
school desegregation cases, for example, they might secure “peace, but 
not racial equality” — and they do not yield any authoritative 
interpretation of law.25  Fiss further noted that settlements prompt 
compelling questions about “authoritative consent.”26  Finally, Fiss found 
that new settlement conference guidelines could not effectively address 
the differences in what might be appropriate for amicably resolving  
 
 
 20 Id. at 92. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Fiss, supra note 2, at 1075. 
 23 Id. at 1073-75. 
 24 Id. at 1076-77. 
 25 Id. at 1085. 
 26 Id. at 1078-82.  Such questions arise where parties “are not individuals but rather 
organizations or groups” whose voices regarding consent are unknown.  Id. at 1078. 
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“significant” cases27 as compared to more routine cases, such as 
“boundary quarrels.”28 
In an early work, Professor Judith Resnik also spoke warily of the new 
initiatives promoting increased judicial settlement conferencing in the 
federal district courts.29  Generally, she was less concerned with 
congressional changes to the role of judges involving “procedural 
innovations and the articulation of new rights and remedies”30 where 
judicial discretion often is controlled.31  Rather, she was especially uneasy 
with “the growth of managerial judging” which had been prompted by 
“changes initiated by judges themselves in response to work load 
pressures.”32  In particular, Professor Resnik was distressed with judges 
making such changes ad hoc and not by rule, standing order, or any 
other written guideline.33  She lamented that judge-initiated changes are 
made “privately, informally, off the record, and beyond the reach of 
appellate review.”34  She further reflected that federal judicial rulemakers 
actually encouraged settlement initiatives35 but then “failed to articulate 
the rules by which judicial management should work.”36 
The scheduling, and even mandating, of judicial settlement 
conferences should be more significantly regulated, not eliminated or 
dramatically reduced.  Abolition or retrenchment seems unlikely, at least 
in the short term.  Professor Resnik has chronicled that many federal 
courts have only begun to encourage settlement conferencing more 
strongly.37  More importantly, elimination or reduction of settlement 
 
 27 Id. at 1087. 
 28 Id. at 1089 (employing phrase used by Derek Bok in report to Harvard Overseers to 
illustrate “essentially private” disputes). 
 29 Resnik, supra note 10, at 417 (“No one can oppose efforts to curtail exploitation of the 
judicial system, to make dispute resolution quick and inexpensive, or to increase the 
accountability of judges and attorneys.  I do, however, question the extent to which 
managerial judging contributes to these worthy aims and whether it is wise to rely on 
judges to achieve these goals.”). 
 30 Id. at 391. 
 31 Id. at 439 (“Congress is better equipped than the judiciary . . . to investigate and 
refashion systematically the dispute resolution process”); see also id. at 444-45 (arguing that 
Congress, and thus not “judges alone,” should be involved in addressing “problems raised 
by managerial judging”). 
 32 Id. at 391. 
 33 Id. at 426. 
 34 Id. 
 35 See id. at 378-79; see also id. at 399-400 (referencing proposed amendments to federal 
civil procedure rule on pretrial conferences). 
 36 Id. at 439. 
 37 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury:  Transforming the Meaning 
of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 937 (2000).  Resnik herself has recently suggested 
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conferencing is unwarranted, as the judicially imposed settlement 
conference is crucial, in Professor Molot’s words, “in the arsenal of 
judicial management tools.”38  Wholly private settlement talks are no 
substitute.39  Such private settlement talks can be hindered by 
“bargaining imbalances”40 that trial judges would otherwise be able to 
offset.41  The presence of unwilling but important participants cannot be 
coerced privately.  Privately arranged settlement pacts also fail to assure 
summary judicial enforcement for later breaches, which is often an 
important factor in civil case agreements.  Assessments and suggestions 
made during settlement talks by impartial, informed, and experienced 
judges can often move even recalcitrant adversaries to compromise, 
especially when the parties responsibly estimate the true costs of 
adjudication.  Participants in judicial settlement conferences are also 
likely to exchange better information, as “court-based bargaining” can 
involve both compelled disclosures and duties of candor.42  Finally, trial 
judges can, to some degree, protect weaker parties from overreaching by 
stronger parties, by lessening what Professor Fiss calls “distributional 
 
varying settlement conference reforms.  Resnik, Procedure as Contract, supra note 8, at 626-
65. 
 38 Molot, supra note 2, at 90.  See, for example, Fong v. American Airlines, 431 F. Supp. 
1334, 1339 (N.D. Cal. 1977), where the court observed: 
Judicial intervention in the settlement process, even if not universally favored or 
practiced, is an absolute necessity in the federal judicial system, burdened as it is 
by a staggering and ever-growing case load. . . . Intervention may, of course, take 
many different forms depending on the personality, style and experience of the 
individual judge.  It may, among others, take the form of an expression by the 
judge of his reaction to the allegations, admissions and denials contained in the 
pleadings and his evaluation of each party’s prospects of success in the litigation.  
To subject judges to the risk of disqualification on the basis of statements of this 
kind would jeopardize their effectiveness as catalysts in the settlement process. 
 39 Cf. Molot, supra note 2, at 92 (arguing judicial settlement conferencing is unnecessary 
since most civil cases will be “settled anyway”); Resnik, supra note 10, at 424 (“Further, 
because many cases settle without judicial intervention, management may require judges 
to supervise lawsuits that would have ended of their own accord, lawsuits that would not 
have consumed any [or many] judicial resources.”). 
 40 Molot, supra note 2, at 92. 
 41 For example, should judicial enforcement of any settlement breach be available in 
the same court where suit was commenced, the trial judge’s approval, and thus input, will 
be necessary. 
 42 Resnik, Procedure as Contract, supra note 8, at 652 (discussing disclosures akin to 
“discovery rights” and candor like that required in class action settlement talks); see also 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2003) (requiring meritorious claims and 
contentions by lawyers to judges); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (requiring 
candor of lawyers to tribunals); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (prohibiting 
lawyer conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). 
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inequalities”43 that can result in unfair settlements.44  This is not to 
suggest that judicial management should be employed in all lawsuits; 
especially unworthy are “lawsuits that would have ended of their own 
accord . . . [and] would not have consumed any [or many] judicial 
resources.”45 
In pursuing more judicial case management, federal and state 
lawmakers should revise current judicial settlement conference 
practices.46  Today there are significant difficulties arising from, in 
Professor Molot’s words, the relatively “unbounded,”47 “unchecked,”48 
“unbridled,”49 and “virtually unfettered discretion”50 of trial judges.  
Molot warns that judicial “efforts to influence outcomes in settlement 
conferences” can “represent a wild card beyond the control of the 
litigants or the law.”51 
II. IMPROVING JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES 
In frowning upon possible new formalities for judicial settlement 
conferences, Professor Molot failed to explore completely Professor 
Fuller’s analysis of the “traditional judicial role.”52  In fact, that analysis is 
quite helpful to those who would formalize judicial settlement practices.  
Fuller recognized that, at times, trial judges should propose a “deal,”53 
 
 43 Fiss, supra note 2, at 1077-78. 
 44 See also Resnik, Procedure as Contract, supra note 8, at 662 (arguing that in prompting 
“growing obligation to bargain” on behalf of civil litigants, lawmakers should also 
“improve the ability of litigants to bargain” fairly, though there may be “conditions of 
profound inequality”). 
 45 Resnik, supra note 10, at 424. 
 46 Brian J. Shoot & Christopher T. McGrath, “Don’t Come Back Without a Reasonable 
Offer”:  Surprisingly Little Direct Authority Guides How Judges Can Move Parties (pt. 2), 76 N.Y. 
ST. B.J. 28, 34 (2004) (“[W]hile it may be pointless to mandate or preclude a ‘pro-active’ 
pursuit of settlements, there should be, we believe, some guidance as to which procedures 
are permissible and which are not.  Such standards are necessary not only to curb coercive 
practices, but also to provide positive assurance to judges who may shy away from 
permissible procedures out of a misguided but understandable concern that such conduct 
may later be criticized as violating the current amorphous standards.”). 
 47 Molot, supra note 2, at 93. 
 48 Id. at 85. 
 49 Id. at 93. 
 50 Id. at 92. 
 51 Id. at 84 & n.246 (stating that “open-ended, case-specific character” of eighteenth-
century trial court efforts to influence outcomes by commenting on evidence “rendered 
them less susceptible to control by appeals courts and the rule of law than other trial court 
mechanisms”). 
 52 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 53 Fuller, supra note 10, at 369-70. 
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though when doing so, they mediate rather than adjudicate.  Such 
dealing makes the relevant “form of social ordering” more one of 
contract than adjudication54 and changes the judge’s role from a 
relatively pristine form of adjudication to a “mixed, parasitic, and 
perverted” form of adjudication.55 
The move to a mixed form of adjudication prompts unique dangers, 
according to Fuller, including “premature cataloguing,”56 standardless 
“wisdom-directed personal power,”57 and judges who attempt “to write 
contracts” rather than lay down “rules about contracting.”58  Yet, Fuller 
recognized that, notwithstanding these dangers, this mixed form of 
adjudication can promote good civil dispute resolution.  Thus, he did not 
“condemn[] all departures of adjudication from a state of pristine 
purity.”59  In fact, he found certain mixed forms of adjudication 
“valuable and almost indispensable.”60 
The “traditional judicial role” has always contemplated at least some 
settlement facilitation by trial judges.61  Yet the recognition of even this 
simple proposition has often been flawed.  Consider the American Bar 
Association’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct, now undergoing a major 
revision.  The chair of the reviewing committee has solicited comments 
on the role that judges should play in encouraging parties to settle.62  The 
final draft of the new judicial code suggests it will continue to say:  “A 
judge may, with the consent of the parties, confer separately with the 
parties and their lawyers in an effort to settle matters pending before the 
 
 54 See id. at 363. 
 55 Id. at 382; see also id. at 408 (arguing that “adjudicative process” becomes “parasitic 
upon a regime of contract” when settlement talks occur). 
 56 Id. at 383. 
 57 Id. at 406. 
 58 Id. at 404. 
 59 Id. at 382. 
 60 Id.; see also id. at 405 (“It may be well to warn again against the assumption that 
every mixed or ‘impure’ form of adjudication is here condemned.”). 
 61 See, e.g., Alfred P. Murrah, Pre-Trial Procedure:  A Statement of Its Essentials, 14 F.R.D. 
417, 424 (1953-1954) (noting recognition in 1944 by U.S. Judicial Conference “that 
settlement is a by-product of good pre-trial procedure rather than a primary objective to be 
actively pursued by the judge”). 
 62 Memorandum from Mark I. Harrison, Chair, ABA Joint Comm’n to Evaluate the 
Model Code of Judicial Conduct, to Individuals and Entities Interested in Judicial Ethics 
(May 11, 2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/memo_canon1_ 
051104.pdf (accompanying release of preliminary draft of revisions to Canons 1 and 2).  
The work of the Commission is regularly updated at American Bar Association, ABA Joint 
Commission to Evaluate the Model Code of Judicial Conduct Webpage, 
http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/home.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2006). 
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judge.”63  Unfortunately, this statement fails to embody all that might 
occur at judicial settlement conferences.  The suggested settlement 
prerogative would appear within the second section of Canon 2, which 
speaks to the judge’s responsibilities with respect to “adjudication.”64  
The implication is that the pending “matters” are the same matters that 
are otherwise subject to adjudication.  Likewise, the code mentions only 
the “parties” — by implication, the parties with matters pending before 
the judge in question — and their lawyers.  Yet, federal and state trial 
judges often help settle matters that they could not adjudicate.  For 
example, participants often settle matters factually related to pending 
civil claims and involving subrogation, insurance, indemnification, or 
attorney’s fees.  The decision in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. 
Epstein65 is particularly illustrative, as it allows state judicial involvement 
in civil case settlement talks about federal claims that could never have 
been brought to trial in state court due to exclusive federal court subject 
matter jurisdiction.66  Put another way, settlement conferences can 
include discussions of claims and other matters that could not be tried on 
the merits.  Thus, settlement talks often should (and do) involve those 
who are neither “parties” nor lawyers for parties.  Yet, these same 
participants go unnoted in both the current and the proposed judicial 
conduct codes. 
Some techniques for contemporary judicial settlement conferences 
pose little threat to the traditional judicial role.  Not surprisingly, 
Professor Fuller envisioned techniques that center around “the affected 
party’s [or person’s] participation.”67  He declared: 
Even in the most formal and adversary presentation an arbiter can 
often discern some indication of what the parties would regard as 
an acceptable settlement simply from the relative emphasis placed 
on the various issues and arguments.  This discreet reading between 
the lines, far from being a perversion of adjudication, serves to 
enhance its efficacy.  But the fact that all human relations are  
 
 63 ABA JOINT COMM’N TO EVALUATE THE MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, FINAL 
DRAFT REPORT, Canon 2.10(A)(3), at 7 (2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/ 
judicialethics/Canon2Final.pdf [hereinafter FINAL DRAFT REPORT].  The current Model 
Code contains this language in MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(7)(d) (1999). 
 64 FINAL DRAFT REPORT, supra note 63, at 3.  Likewise, the current Code uses the 
heading “Adjudicative Responsibilities.”  MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B). 
 65 516 U.S. 367 (1996). 
 66 Id. at 369. 
 67 Fuller, supra note 10, at 382. 
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tinctured with a slight element of dissimulation is no reason to 
elevate dissimulation to the level of principle.68 
Fuller saw certain types of civil disputes as being more appropriate 
than others for judicial mediation.  Such disputes are “polycentric,” or 
many-centered, making it “simply impossible to afford each affected 
party a meaningful participation through proofs and arguments.”69  
These disputes often involve many interested persons, where the 
disposition of any single dispute between two persons has “implications 
for the proper disposition” of all other related disputes.70  Such disputes 
are “unsuited to solution by adjudication,”71 so that in the absence of 
private contract,72 judges should at times try to prompt solutions by 
employing “managerial direction.”73 
Judicial settlement conferences can be, as urged by Fuller, more 
controlled by participants.  For such control, we must recognize not only 
the need for a more “meaningful opportunity for litigants to control 
judicial behavior,”74 but also the need for a more meaningful opportunity 
for input from other interested persons, including those not formally 
joined as parties in the relevant civil litigation.  The parties named in the 
claims that are subject to trial court adjudication should not be the only 
ones to gain control.  Rather, the broader array of adversaries and other 
folks whose voices should be heard during settlement talks also warrant 
control.  Disputes and interests75 that cannot be resolved by adjudication 
in a civil case can nevertheless still be resolved by settlement.76  Indeed, 
 
 68 Id. at 409. 
 69 Id. at 394-95. 
 70 Id. at 394 (stating that form of adjudication “cannot encompass and take into account 
the complex repercussions”); see also id. at 404 (“Now it is characteristic of a polycentric 
relationship that the relations of individual members to one another are not controlled by 
principles peculiar to those relations, just as it is impossible to build a bridge by 
establishing distinct principles governing the angle of every pair of girders.”). 
 71 Id. at 398.  Disputes can be “sufficiently polycentric” so as to be “unsuited to solution 
by adjudication” even when the underlying cases are very “simple-appearing.” Id. 
 72 Id.  Fuller suggests that “contract” and “reciprocity” may be interchangeable in this 
context.  Id. 
 73 Id. (“[I]n the practical solution of [polycentric issues] a good deal of ‘intuition’ is 
indispensable.”). 
 74 Molot, supra note 2, at 93. 
 75 Herein, “disputes” involve existing claims and adversaries, whether or not they are 
subject to pleading or party status.  “Interests” do not involve alleged breaches of duty, but 
only similar or overlapping concerns (e.g., future claims) for folks who may then bargain 
about these concerns for their mutual benefit. 
 76 See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 375 (1996) (finding 
federal court deference generally “applicable in cases in which the state-court judgment . . . 
incorporates a class-action settlement releasing claims solely within the jurisdiction of the 
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the resolution of such nonjusticiable disputes and interests can be 
indispensable to any complete settlement of a pending civil action.  Trial 
judges can and should facilitate complete resolutions.  Plaintiffs want to 
know not only what defendants will pay, but also how much of their 
payment must be given to certain nonparty creditors, including insurers, 
health care providers, and lawyers.  Defendants’ insurers, who are 
adversaries but usually nonparties, want to know not only what the 
defendants owe, but also what, if any, portions of the debts are the 
insurers’ responsibility.  Thus, during judicial settlement conferences, 
attention must be directed not only to the parties, but also to the 
adversarial nonparties and others whose input may be necessary for, or 
may facilitate, complete resolution. 
Judicial settlement conferences can also be, Fuller urged, subject to 
more clearly articulated “legal standards” in line with enhanced 
participation opportunities and the “traditional judicial role.”77  Molot 
was incorrect in denying that additional formalities78 could promote not 
only greater control by all adversaries in judicial settlement conferences, 
but also “the judiciary’s institutional competence, constitutional 
authority, and historical practices.”79  Rather, “judicial leeway” would 
certainly be cabined80 if there were standards that generally foreclosed 
trial judges from scheduling judicial settlement conferences where at 
least one of the parties, acting in good faith and reasonably, voiced 
strong objection.  When conferences are scheduled, these standards 
 
federal courts”).  Thus, a state court can exercise at least some ancillary authority over 
factually interdependent claims so that it may dispose of all related claims in a single 
proceeding, even though not all claims were subject to adjudication by that state court.  Id. 
 77 Molot, supra note 2, at 29. 
 78 Molot states: 
If we were to . . . reconcile the judicial role in contemporary pretrial practice with 
the judicial role embraced by the Founders, described by Fuller, and still found 
today in trial practice — we would promote formal tools of control like summary 
judgment, formalize those management tools that are susceptible to 
formalization, like those governing discovery, and either reject or substantially 
revise management tools that are not susceptible to formalization, like the 
settlement conference. 
Molot, supra note 2, at 88.  Seemingly because Molot focuses on providing only “a sorely 
needed conceptual framework with which to analyze contemporary procedural problems,” 
he offers no advice on revising settlement conference practices or on the negative 
implications of abolishing such conferences.  Id. at 118; cf. Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 
supra note 8, at 662-65 (suggesting new written judicial settlement conference guidelines for 
such matters as contract validity, assignment of judges, and same-case enforcement). 
 79 Molot, supra note 2, at 90. 
 80 Id. at 87.  This is a desirable goal for Molot.  Id. 
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could also require adversaries and others to routinely provide certain 
input in advance (i.e., by completing court-mandated forms that need 
not be fully revealed to all participants and would only be accessible to 
the presiding trial judge or officer).81  This would serve to deter the 
frustration of the judge, which can lead to hostility as well as to 
“erroneous” judicial views prompted by “personal whim.”82  Finally, 
requiring trial judges to accommodate reasonable requests for accessible 
and inexpensive techniques for participation in settlement talks, such as 
telephone conferencing, would further promote participant control.83 
Might new written standards further “cabin judicial leeway and 
promote uniformity in judicial approach,”84 thus enhancing “the 
judiciary’s institutional competence”?85  Might “legal criteria”86 or “legal 
standards”87 limit “judicial overreaching”?88  While Congress and the 
federal civil procedure rulemakers have written little on judicial 
settlement conferences, a few contemporary, local federal district court 
rules, as well as some generally applicable state statutes and court rules, 
exemplify worthy guidelines.  It bears repeating that any newly written 
laws must include all those who might participate in settlement talks, 
recognize all that might be discussed in settlement talks, and anticipate 
all that might be involved in post-settlement court proceedings.  Thus, 
any new laws should mention not only the parties, their agents, and their 
lawyers, but others as well, including varying types of lienholders and 
insurers.  Further, any new laws should contemplate possible 
conferencing about disputes and issues beyond the pleaded claims and 
 
 81 See, e.g., ALASKA R. APP. P. 222(d)(1) (“The settlement conference will be conducted 
informally at a location designated by the settlement officer.  The parties shall not submit 
settlement briefs unless requested to do so by the settlement officer.  If briefs are requested, 
they must be submitted directly to the settlement officer, who will return them to the 
parties who submitted them at the conclusion of the settlement proceedings.  A party’s 
brief may not be disclosed to anyone, including any other party, without the submitting 
party’s consent and will not be available to the court.”); see also 11TH CIR. R. 33-1(d) (“The 
court requires, except as waived by the circuit mediator, that counsel in appeals selected for 
mediation send a confidential mediation statement assessing the appeal to the Kinnard 
Mediation Center before the mediation.  The Kinnard Mediation Center will not share the 
confidential mediation statement with the other side, and it will not become part of the 
court file.”). 
 82 Molot, supra note 2, at 93 & n.292. 
 83 Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c) (noting only that if “appropriate,” trial court “may” require 
either presence or reasonable availability by telephone). 
 84 Molot, supra note 2, at 89. 
 85 Id. at 90. 
 86 Id. at 31. 
 87 Id. at 29. 
 88 Id. at 87. 
  
1904 University of California, Davis [Vol. 39:1891 
defenses.  Guidelines for same-case civil claim settlement enforcement 
proceedings should be included as well.89  Express declarations would 
lessen debates about what, if any, inherent judicial powers go beyond 
those powers explicitly recognized in rules or statutes.90  They would 
also eliminate any perceived need for a tortured judicial reading of an 
existing written law so that an unaddressed issue will fit.91 
Some lawmaking initiatives on judicial settlement conference 
guidelines may raise vexing separation of powers issues.  Legal criteria 
on such conferencing may contain elements appropriate for the differing 
lawmakers (i.e., legislatures and varying judicial rulemakers) responsible 
for laws on substance (i.e., settlement contract), procedure (i.e., 
settlement contract enforcement), and professional conduct (i.e., attorney 
settlement authority and judicial impartiality). 
Certain current, “established legal standards,”92 addressing matters 
beyond Fuller’s concerns about greater control by adversaries, are 
available for more widespread adoption.  One type of guideline concerns 
who should or may preside at judicial settlement conferences.  An 
appellate court guideline declares that upon motion or on its own, the 
court may appoint an otherwise uninvolved “retired justice or judge, an 
active judge, or a private neutral to serve as the settlement officer.”93  
This approach may be impractical and very inefficient, however, 
especially for courts situated in rural communities with only a few trial 
judges.  A guideline now employed by some state trial courts prevents a 
 
 89 See, e.g., Parness & Walker, supra note 3, passim (discussing when civil case 
settlement may be enforced in very same case in which it arose and when judicial 
enforcement requires filing of new case). 
 90 See, for example, the varying opinions about whether there are inherent powers to 
compel attendance at settlement conferences that extend beyond the precise powers 
recognized expressly in the 1983 version of Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(on pretrial conferences) expressed by the panel in G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat 
Corp., 871 F.2d 648 passim (7th Cir. 1989).  Cf. ME. R. CIV. P. 16(b) (expressly allowing certain 
types of attendance orders unaddressed in 1983 federal rule, including mandates to parties 
and their insurers).  On the general confusion over the scope of inherent federal judicial 
powers, see, for example, Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 561-62 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(en banc) (noting that few cases have discussed inherent powers, that they have been 
described as “nebulous” and “shadowy,” and that “it is not always possible to categorize 
inherent power decisions”). 
 91 See, e.g., In re Novak, 932 F.2d 1397, 1407 n.19 (11th Cir. 1991) (straining to read term 
“unrepresented parties” in Rule 16 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to include some 
parties who have lawyers).  This opinion has been criticized in Jeffrey A. Parness & 
Matthew R. Walker, Thinking Outside the Civil Case Box:  Reformulating Pretrial Conference 
Laws, 50 KAN. L. REV. 347, 364-65 (2002). 
 92 Molot, supra note 2, at 87. 
 93 ALASKA R. APP. P. 222.  Absent party waiver, this officer “shall not participate in 
subsequent judicial decisions related to the case.”  Id. 
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trial judge who will preside at any later bench trial in a case from 
conducting a settlement conference.94  Here, too, practicalities may 
preclude full implementation, especially in the absence of available 
fellow trial judges or parajudges.95 
Another type of guideline involves the possible enforcement of 
agreements reached at judicial settlement conferences.  One state statute 
says:  “If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing . . . or orally 
before the court, for settlement . . . the court, upon motion, may enter 
judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.  If requested by the 
parties, the court may retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the 
settlement.”96 
Yet another type of guideline involves the validity of settlement 
agreements.  One state court rule says:  “Unless otherwise provided . . . 
no agreement between attorneys or parties touching any suit pending 
will be enforced unless it be in writing, signed and filed with the papers 
as part of the record, or unless it be made in open court and entered of 
record.”97  A comparable statute from another state says that agreements 
“must be either reduced into writing or recited in open court and capable 
 
 94 See, e.g., C.D. ILL. LOCAL R. 16.1(B) (“The settlement conference in a matter to be tried 
to the court shall be conducted by a judge who will not preside at the trial of the case.”). 
 95 The difficulties with perceived and actual biases by trial judges who attempt to 
facilitate settlements and later preside over trials (bench or jury) are discussed in Daisy 
Hurst Floyd, Can the Judge Do that? — The Need for a Clearer Judicial Role in Settlement, 26 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 45, 84 (1994) (“There should be some vehicle other than disqualification for 
attacking the problem of judicial bias regarding the court’s involvement in settlement.”).  
Perhaps waivers should normally be sought from parties when the same judge pretries and 
tries a case.  See, e.g., Team Design v. Gottlieb, 104 S.W.3d 512, 523 & n.33 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
2002) (describing history of Tennessee settlement promotion laws since 1995, including 
provision permitting trial judge assigned to try case to preside over judicial settlement 
conference only where parties agree (citing TENN. SUP. CT. R. 31, § 20)); see also Enter. 
Leasing Co. v. Jones, 789 So. 2d 964, 967-68 (Fla. 2001) (holding that trial judge is not 
automatically disqualified simply because of knowledge of settlement offers made during 
confidential mediation that were reported to judge in violation of confidentiality statute; 
generally, absent demonstration of bias or prejudice, judges are trusted to set aside their 
personal knowledge of inadmissible or irrelevant matters). 
 96 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 664.6 (West 2006).  Where a court retains settlement 
enforcement jurisdiction, it should not always exercise it.  Unfortunately, the California 
Civil Procedure Code provides no guidance on making the discretionary determinations on 
later same-case enforcement (or enforcement in a wholly new case).  Cf. Paulucci v. Gen. 
Dynamics Corp., 842 So. 2d 797, 802-03 (Fla. 2003).  The Paulucci court would allow same-
case enforcement where a settlement contract has continuing validity and the court earlier 
ordered compliance with the terms of the contract.  Id.  In contrast, where the contractual 
relationship ends due to material breach and a party seeks general damages that were not 
specified in the contract, a new civil case is needed for enforcement.  Id. at 803. 
 97 TEX. R. CIV. P. 11. 
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of being transcribed from the record of the proceeding.”98 
At times, general guidelines on settlement conferences are preempted 
by special guidelines, perhaps written by different lawmakers or by 
lawmakers employing different lawmaking processes.99  In Illinois, the 
high court has an attorney professional conduct rule that is generally 
relevant to civil claims and reads:  “A lawyer shall abide by a client’s 
decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter.”100  Yet, 
Illinois precedents have long recognized the special unwritten standard 
that an “attorney of record’s authority to settle . . . is presumed” when 
settlement talks occur in “open court.”101  Further, the Illinois General 
Assembly has crafted special guidelines on attorney civil claim 
settlement authority for attorneys representing certain local 
governments.102 
Comparably, special guidelines on judicial settlement conferencing can 
be written for only certain civil cases, such as when the claims are 
routine rather than “significant,” according to Fiss,103 or involve only 
limited sums.  For other civil procedure matters, such as pleading 
requirements104 and formal discovery methods,105 lawmakers have often 
 
 98 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3071 (2005). 
 99 Maurice Rosenberg, The Federal Civil Rules After Half a Century, 36 ME. L. REV. 243, 
249 (1984) (“Selective treatment of cases by distinct categories is not a wild or wicked idea 
or even a novelty in judicial administration.”). 
 100 ILL. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.2(a).  The rule itself is immediately followed by a 
seemingly similar declaration that in a criminal case, “the lawyer shall abide by the client’s 
decision . . . as to a plea to be entered.”  Id.  Despite the similarity, in practice the rule 
operates very differently in criminal cases, in that there can be no delegation of plea 
authority by client to lawyer.  ILL. SUP. CT. R. 402(b). 
 101 Brewer v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 649 N.E.2d 1331, 1334 (Ill. 1995); see also Koval 
v. Simon Telelect, Inc., 693 N.E.2d 1299, 1306 (Ind. 1998) (recognizing attorney’s inherent 
agency authority, while noting that rule is “so commonly cited and yet so infrequently 
explained”); cf. Harris v. Ray Johnson Constr. Co., 534 S.E.2d 653, 654 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) 
(presuming attorney settlement authority, although talks occurred outside of court). 
 102 The civil claim settlement authority of city attorneys and corporation counsels for 
Illinois municipalities is often set out in municipal codes, though the extent of authority 
varies.  Compare DEKALB, ILL., MUN. CODE § 3.17 (2005) (authorizing city attorney to “take[] 
steps . . . for the best interests of the city and for the promotion of justice”), with CHI., ILL., 
MUN. CODE § 2-60-080 (2005) (authorizing corporation counsel, “when directed by the city 
council, to make settlements of lawsuits . . . against the city”).  Unfortunately, Illinois law 
does not always clearly describe the settlement authority of other government officials, 
which leads to confusion.  See, e.g., Carver v. Condie, 243 F.3d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(certifying to Illinois Supreme Court question whether Illinois law requires counties to pay 
judgments entered against sheriffs’ offices when founded on agreements made by sheriffs, 
after declaring “the law of Illinois does not provide a clean solution to this conflict” and 
that court’s “tour through state law has not produced a clear answer”). 
 103 Fiss, supra note 2, at 1087. 
 104 Compare, for example, the general pleading standards in Illinois with the standards 
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already successfully distinguished among civil cases by following the 
admonition of the late Professor Maurice Rosenberg, who said:  
“Cadillac-style procedures are not needed to process bicycle-size 
lawsuits.”106  As to judicial settlement conferences, written procedural 
laws could deny, or be very cautious about, same-case judicial 
enforcement for settlement contract breaches107 involving novel or 
complex issues of state law108 or small dollar amounts.109  They could also 
describe the exceptional settings where settlements that would normally 
be accessible might be sealed.110  They could require that money transfers 
 
governing small claims cases and healing art malpractice cases.  Compare 735 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 5/2-601 (West 2005) (requiring “substantial allegations of fact” in order “to 
state any cause of action”), with ILL. SUP. CT. R. 282(a) (stating that action on small claim is 
commenced with “short and simple complaint”), and 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-622 (2005) 
(stating that civil actions seeking damages founded on healing art malpractice usually 
require affidavits indicating consultation and review by health professionals who have 
concluded that proposed actions present “reasonable and meritorious” causes).  In the 
federal district courts, there are usually notice pleading requirements under Rule 8(a)(1) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, though “particularity” is required when “fraud or 
mistake” are averred, per Rule 9(b).  Even more rigorous special standards govern some 
federal securities actions under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 
U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(1) (2005). 
 105 Compare, for example, the formal discovery generally permitted in civil cases 
involving less than $50,000 and more than $50,000.  See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 201(a) (making 
formal discovery methods generally available); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 222 (allowing limited and 
simplified discovery in “civil actions seeking money damages not in excess of $50,000”); 
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 287(a) (disallowing discovery in small claims cases [under $5000 per Illinois 
Supreme Court Rule 281] “except by leave of court”).  Discovery may also be limited by the 
type of civil claimant or the type of civil case.  Thus, in some New York federal district 
courts, formal discovery in certain prisoner pro se cases (use of force, inmate against 
inmate, and disciplinary due process) is often limited to “standard discovery requests” 
involving interrogatories and document production.  S. & E.D.N.Y. CIV. LOCAL R. 33.2.  In 
Illinois, “by administrative order,” there are standard forms of interrogatories for different 
classes of cases.  ILL. SUP. CT. R. 213(j).  The forms now encompass motor vehicle, 
matrimonial, and medical malpractice cases; they supercede, per Illinois Supreme Court 
Rule 213(c), the general bar on more than 30 interrogatories. 
 106 Rosenberg, supra note 99, at 247 (noting that such procedures are what Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure “often appear to require”).  Rosenberg suggests procedural law 
distinctions can be grounded not only on the types of substantive claims involved or the 
amount of money in controversy, but also on the significant preferences of the parties (i.e., 
“informal, inexpensive processing”; “full-scale” procedures; the need for expert decision 
makers; and “privacy”).  Id. at 249-50. 
 107 See generally United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 440-41 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(refusing to provide “perfunctory approval” of such settlements, and suggesting instead 
that judicial guidelines be distilled from class action and bankruptcy compromise cases). 
 108 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1) (2005) (allowing district courts to decline to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over claims raising novel or complex issues of state law). 
 109 Guidance is found in COLO. R. CIV. P. 16.1 (providing simplified procedures for 
many cases involving less than $100,000). 
 110 Guidance is found in Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 928 (7th Cir. 2002), as well as in 
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made to meet routine cash settlements be completed within a certain 
time period.111  Finally, they could describe the general attributes of civil 
cases where magistrates, masters, or other neutrals might be employed 
differently to help the parties and interested persons reach an 
agreement.112 
CONCLUSION 
Professors Molot, Fuller, and Fiss, among others, have expressed 
concerns about the unbounded, unchecked, unbridled, and virtually 
unfettered judicial discretion of trial judges who preside over civil case 
settlement conferences.  I, too, am concerned.  But the best response is 
not to abolish or severely restrict judicial settlement conferences.  Rather, 
it is to add more formality and more written guidelines.  New guidelines 
would discourage each trial court from marching “to the beat of its own 
drummer.”113  These guidelines should involve, as suggested by Fuller, 
both more adversary control and more detailed and written criteria.  In 
addition, new guidelines should expressly recognize that the claims and 
interests that might be discussed at judicial settlement conferences are 
far more expansive than the justiciable claims that might be discussed at 
trial preparation conferences.  Thus, civil case settlements subject to 
same-case judicial enforcement can involve many more claims, interests, 
and people than would have been involved in any adversarial 
proceedings in the same case.  New written guidelines for federal and 
state courts should follow existing rules and statutes of general and 
particular applicability already operating in some American trial 
courts.114  As with pleading and discovery, new settlement conference 
guidelines should speak to differences between civil actions, including, 
 
some existing court rules, like S.C. R. CIV. P. 41.1 (governing sealing of settlements). 
 111 Guidance is found in PA. R. CIV. P. 229.1 (providing sanctions for failure to deliver 
settlement funds within certain period). 
 112 Guidance is found in D. ME. CIV. LOCAL R. 16.3 (differentiating management track 
procedures for administrative (including habeas corpus, social security disability and 
bankruptcy), standard, complex, toxic tort, and prisoner civil rights cases). 
 113 G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 666 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(Ripple, J., dissenting) (frowning on overly broad and nonliteral readings of authorization 
in federal pretrial conference rule for trial judges to compel attendance at settlement 
conferences). 
 114 Guidelines for American trial court judges who attempt to prompt settlements can 
also be found in the recent American appellate court experiences with settlement 
conferencing.  See supra note 81 (describing rules providing for submission of confidential 
memoranda to appellate court settlement officers or circuit mediators); supra note 93 and 
accompanying text (providing that settlement officer may not be person who might have to 
decide case on merits later). 
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perhaps, distinctions between “significant cases”115 and routine cases or 
between cases based upon the amounts in controversy. 
 
 115 Fiss, supra note 2, at 1087. 
